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ABSTRACT 
 
Using detailed trader surveys in Benin, Madagascar, and Malawi, this paper 
investigates the presence of increasing returns in agricultural trade. After analyzing 
margins, costs, and value added, we find little evidence of returns to scale. Motorized 
transport is found more cost effective for large loads on longer distances. But transporters 
pool quantities from multiple traders. Margin rates show little relationship with 
transaction size.  Personal travel costs are a source of increasing returns, but the effect is 
small. Consequently, total marketing costs are nearly proportional to transaction size. 
Working and network capital are key determinants of value added. Constant returns to 
scale in all accumulable factors ￿ working capital, labor, and network capital -- cannot be 
rejected. This implies that policies to restrict entry into agricultural trade are neither 
necessary nor useful. Governments should focus instead on technological and 
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Over the last two decades, the world has witnessed a landslide movement towards 
market liberalization. Although the pace and depth of liberalization have varied from 
place to place, the movement has affected both international and domestic markets, and 
no continent remains untouched.   However, the kind of markets that have emerged from 
this movement differs markedly across sectors and countries. Trade in agricultural 
commodities offers a striking illustration (Swinnen 1997, Kherallah et al., 2002). In 
developed economies, liberalization has resulted in concentration and vertical integration, 
with a small number of large corporations purchasing directly from farmers and selling to 
distributors. In many instances, producers have become sub-contractors on contract with 
agri-business corporations that provide them with credit and inputs and purchase their 
output. A corporation such as Cargill, for instance, commands a major share of all grain 
produced in the U.S. Mid-West. Agri-businesses also take care of quality control, 
transport, storage, and processing (Jaffee and Morton, 1995).  
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In contrast, market liberalization in poorer countries has resulted in de-
concentration and specialization. As state-controlled agricultural marketing boards were 
abolished or scaled down, domestic trade in agricultural products was taken over by a 
myriad of small operators operating in a rudimentary fashion. This is particularly true in 
Africa (Staatz, Dione, and  Dembele, 1989; Berg1989; Barrett, 1997; Fafchamps and 
Minten,  1999; Fafchamps and Minten, 2002; Jayne and Jones, 1997; Coulter and 
Poulton, 1999).  The presence of a large number of traders suggests that competition is 
fierce. One therefore expects individual traders to be fairly efficient given the constraints 
they face. At the same time, concentration (measured by the Gini coefficient) is 
extremely high, indicating the co-existence of a few very large enterprises with a large 
number of very small trading enterprises, which suggests that at least some trading 
enterprises benefit from increasing returns. 
What remains unclear is how firms of extremely different sizes manage to coexist 
in the same market and what effect this has on system-wide efficiency. The productivity 
of an industry as a whole depends on the individual productivities of the firms that make 
up the sector (Sutton, 1998; Tybout, 2000). The presence of infra-marginal firms reduces 
average efficiency. It also suggests that more efficient firms collect rents and fail to take 
advantage of their higher productivity to eliminate inefficient ones. Tentative evidence to 
this effect can be found in the large gap often observed in Africa between producer and 
consumer food prices (Ahmed and Rustagi, 1987; Staatz et al., 1989; Minten and Kyle, 
1999; Barrett, 1997; Barrett, 1996).  Studies of African traders, however, have often 
emphasized their rationality and (constrained) efficiency. They are described as doing the   3
best they can, given the difficult circumstances in which they operate (Bauer, 1954; 
Jones, 1959; Eddy, 1979; Staatz et al., 1989; Meillassoux, 1971; Cohen 1969). 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether market liberalization and 
widespread competition have resulted in an efficient marketing system for agricultural 
products in sub-Saharan Africa. To address this question, we need to find out whether the 
agricultural marketing system as a whole is efficient, that is, whether traders are capable 
of capturing gains from coordination and of achieving system-wide returns to scale. To 
address this question, we depart from the current literature which has focused primarily 
on price movements (Timmer 1986; Ravallion, 1986; Baulch, 1997; Dercon, 1995; 
Badiane, 1998) and focus instead on trader costs and margins. Detailed surveys of traders 
in three recently liberalized countries, Benin, Madagascar, and Malawi, are used to this 
effect. We seek to uncover evidence that increasing returns to scale and returns to vertical 
integration remain unexploited. Our working hypothesis is that, if unexploited returns to 
scale or to coordination are present, agricultural trade would become more efficient by 
concentrating and integrating vertically. The end result would be a marketing system that 
resembles more closely that observed in developed economies. 
In contrast to evidence of increasing returns in US and Spanish manufacturing 
(Morrison and Siegel, 1997; Morrison and Siegel, 1999; Millan, 1999), our results fail to 
uncover evidence of increasing returns in trade. Personal travel costs are the only possible 
exception. Results show that African traders frequently travel to distant markets to 
identify, inspect, and purchase supplies. Personal travel costs represent on average 17% 
of marketing costs in Benin, 21% in Madagascar, and 32% in Malawi. Since personal   4
travel costs per unit decrease with the amount purchased, one would expect large traders 
to out compete small ones and eventually to eliminate them. Although large relative to 
other marketing costs, personal travel costs nevertheless remain too small to generate 
increasing returns in trade.  Transport costs, which are the main component of marketing 
costs, show little reduction with transaction size because of load pooling. 
Traders with insufficient working capital to purchase large loads compensate for 
higher unit costs in various ways. Some concentrate on micro-retail, that is, they buy 
from large traders and resell locally in smaller quantities. So doing, they avoid having to 
travel outside of their market or market town. Others vertically integrate in the sense that 
they purchase small quantities from peri-urban villages to resell directly to urban 
consumers. Contrary to what is observed in developed economies, large agricultural 
traders specialize primarily in wholesale; they are less vertically integrated, i.e., they are 
less likely to purchase directly from producers and to sell directly to consumers. They 
also concentrate in trading per se, less so in transport, storage, and processing. Finally, 
large traders tend to source their supplies from more distant markets, relying for that 
purpose on their extensive network of business contacts.  
Taken together, these results depict a sector where concentration is primarily the 
result of the patient accumulation of working capital and business contacts. Returns to 
scale may be present but, given the high volatility of agricultural markets, they are not 
large enough to eliminate small businesses who manage to survive in specific market 
niches.  System-wide efficiency could be improved by de-emphasizing personal travel   5
and relying more widely on telephones to place orders. This would require more trust 
among traders and a more widespread use of checks and invoicing.  
The paper is organized as follows. The conceptual framework is presented in 
Section 2. The data and main characteristics of surveyed traders are discussed in Section 
3. An analysis of transport costs is presented in Section 4. Margins and marketing costs 
are examined in Section 5.  Conclusions and policy implications are discussed at the end. 
 
2.  A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The aggregate efficiency of agricultural marketing ￿ in a potentially Pareto 
efficient sense ￿ can be expressed as the consumer surplus plus the agricultural producer 
surplus minus marketing costs. This implies that total surplus is largest when the 
consumer price is equal to the producer price plus marketing costs -- there is no rent in 
trade -- and when unit marketing costs are minimized for the marketing chain as a whole 
(Gardner, 1975; Dornbusch, Fisher, and Samuelson, 1977; Takayama and Judge, 1971; 
Benischka and Binkley, 1995).  Marketing rents are likely to arise when traders collude 
or occupy a monopoly or monopsony position. Given that agricultural markets in Africa 
are characterized by widespread competition and free entry, collusion is not a serious 
concern.  Fafchamps and Minten (2002), for instance, reject collusion among agricultural 
traders in Madagascar. Consequently, we focus our attention on the minimization of unit 
marketing costs.    6
Let pp and pc denote producer and consumer price, respectively.  The unit 
marketing costs of trader i are denoted  i c . We assume perfect competition in trade. 
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where M is the number of traders who handled the goods between producer and 
consumer. 
Marketing costs per unit are in general function of the quantities  i q  handled by 
each individual trader, the distance  i d  traveled between trader i and his or her supplier, 
and the number M of intermediaries between producer and consumer. The marketing 
tasks undertaken by trader i is represented by a vector 
1 { ... }
F
ii i f ff =  with each individual 
task {0,1}
j
i f = . Typical tasks are assembly, quality verification and grading, transport, 
storage, processing, retail, and micro-retail. Individual traders may undertake one or 
several tasks, e.g., purchase from producers (assembly) and sell to consumers (retail). 
The model can be expanded to include storage but we ignore it for now. Marketing 
efficiency is maximized when:   
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where the total distanced  between producer and consumer is taken as given. If 
(,,) iiii cqd f is uniformly decreasing in  i q , marketing efficiency is achieved by 
concentrating all trade into the hands of a single trading firm. If, however,  ( , , ) iiii cqd f is   7
decreasing in i q  only up to a point q beyond which unit cost is a constant, firm of 
different sizes may coexist. But no firms of size smaller thanq should be observed. 
Above q size is irrelevant for efficiency (Bain1956). 
Turning to transport, if  ( , , ) iiii cqd f  is decreasing in distance, transport should be 
combined into a single long haul d instead of multiple short hauls. Efficient modes of 
transportation may also vary by distance, e.g., large trucks cheaper on long hauls, 
wheelbarrows and bicycles on short hauls. If, in contrast,  ( , , ) iiii cqd f is constant with  i d , 
bunching transport is unnecessary.  
Regarding the number of intermediaries M, efficiency depends on the presence of 
economies of scope across marketing tasks. For instance, if unit costs are lower when 
assembly is combined with quality verification and grading, it is more efficient for these 
two tasks to be undertaken by a single trader. Formally, two tasks 
j f  and 
k f should be 
combined if:  
( , ,{... 1,..., 1,...})
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Vertical integration, i.e., $M=1$, is optimal whenever economies of scope are strongest, 
that is, when  ( , ,{1,1,1,...1}) cqd provides the lowest unit cost.  
Market efficiency can thus be studied by analyzing the shape of the unit cost 













; and (3) economies of scope, i.e.,   8
equation 2.1. The structure of costs can then be used to ascertain whether the size and 
activity distribution of trading firms is consistent with market-wide efficiency. 
In practice, unit cost has several components: (1) what we call marketing costs, 
that is, measurable cash outlays that vary with traded quantities 
u
i c , such as transport 
costs; (2) what we call operating costs, that is, measurable cash outlays that do not vary 
directly with quantity traded 
f
i c , such as rental of facilities and market fees; and (3) what 
we call profits, that is, residual returns to non-traded inputs such as working capital, 
family labor, and managerial talent  /
sa f
ii i i i p pccq
υ −−− where 
s
i p  is the sales price of 
trader ,
a
i ip is the purchase price, and 
u
i c and 
f
i c are as defined earlier. Other measures of 
interest are what, for the purpose of this paper, we call the gross margin rate 
/1
gs a
ii i pp µ ≡−  and the net margin rate () / 1
ns a
ii i i pc p
υ µ ≡ −− . 
Investigating these three categories of costs is the object of the rest of the paper. 
After having presented the countries and data, we begin by taking a close look at 
marketing costs. We first examine transport costs in detail. We then turn to marketing 
costs and margins. We conclude with an examination of operating costs and profits. 
 
3. MARKET  LIBERALIZATION 
 
The three study countries, Benin, Madagascar, and Malawi, were chosen because 
they both underwent a liberalization of domestic food marketing. But they differ 
dramatically in the role played by the private prior to liberalization. In Benin, the Office 
National des CØrØales (ONC) created in 1983 attempted unsuccessfully to control 25% of   9
the cereals market. It reached only 5% in 1990 due to a lack of human and financial 
resources (Badiane, Goletti, Kherallah, Berry, Govindan, Gruhn and Mendoza, 1997). 
With the exception of the 1976-77 period, market prices of cereals were never controlled 
and private traders largely dominated food markets even prior to liberalization. The 
market reforms launched in 1990 effectively dismantled the ONC, transforming it into an 
agency responsible for supporting food security and for providing market information 
and extension to farmers. Currently, the government’s role in domestic food markets is 
extremely small, controlling only 0.15% of the annual volume of maize traded.  
The situation in Malawi is different in that the government effectively controlled 
domestic food markets. The Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation 
(ADMARC) were established as a monopsonistic buying agent for smallholders’ maize, 
at guaranteed fixed prices. ADMARC provided pan-territorial and pan-seasonal prices for 
farmers, requiring it to subsidize maize prices with export earnings from tobacco. As the 
world prices for tobacco deteriorated, its ability to continue maize subsidies was eroded 
in the early 1980s. In 1981, Malawi embarked on a series of structural adjustment 
programs, which entailed adopting a flexible exchange rate regime and moving slowly 
toward liberalizing its price and marketing policies (Sepp￿l￿, 1997). In 1987, a new series 
of structural adjustment loans were launched, with the conditionality of complete 
privatization of maize marketing. However, although private trading was allowed in this 
period, producer prices remained fixed by the government until as late as 1995, when a 
price band was established (Badiane, 1997). ADMARC administers the price band and 
acts as buyer of last resort. Despite privatization and the closing of a number of   10
ADMARC buying centers, ADMARC remains dominant in the maize market, with 
private traders engaged in bulking for delivery to ADMARC (Beynon, Jones & Yao 
1992). 
In Madagascar too, the government was, for a time, capable of controlling 
domestic food markets. After independence, governments gradually increased their 
intervention in agricultural markets so that, by the end of the 1970’s, most trade in 
agricultural products was in the hands of the state (e.g. Dorosh & Bernier 1994, 
Shuttleworth 1989, Berg 1989). A reversal of policy took place in the 1980’s with a 
gradual transition from a state food marketing system to a liberalized market. From mid 
1983 on, the government supplied all the big cities with subsidized rice (Roubaud 1997). 
The subsidy program continued until October 1988 but its importance declined gradually. 
In November 1986, the government introduced a buffer stock scheme in response to high 
seasonal prices during that year and to defend the ceiling price. However, the buffer stock 
scheme was poorly administered and was ultimately terminated in 1990. In 1991, the 
government introduced an import tax of 30% on rice to protect local production. This tax 
was reduced in 1995 to 10%. The current situation can be described as one in which 
private traders have been given free reign to set buying and selling prices and to move 
agricultural products around the country. The state continues to intervene in agricultural 
markets through buying and selling operations conducted for example by SOMACODIS 
but these operations only represent a very small percentage of the total volume of food 
products transacted domestically. In this respect Madagascar resembles many other 
African countries that have gone through a similar cycle of government interventionism   11
and retreat (Kherallah et al., 2002; Staatz, Dione & Dembele 1989). Trade in agricultural 
products in Madagascar has been analyzed by other authors, most notably (e.g. Barrett 
1997a, Barrett 1997b) and Berg (1989). 
 
4. THE  DATA 
 
Surveys of traders of domestic agricultural products were conducted in 1999/2000 
in Benin (August-September 1999) and Malawi (August 1999-February 2000). A market-
level survey was also conducted in order to obtain information on the marketing 
environment. The work was coordinated by the International Food Policy Research 
Institute (IFPRI), Oxford University, and the World Bank. Data collection in the field 
was directed by the Laboratoire d’Analyse et de Recherche Economique et Sociale 
(LARES) in Benin, and by the Agricultural Policy Research Unit (APRU) in Malawi. A 
similar survey was conducted in Madagascar in the Fall of 2001. Survey work was 
undertaken in collaboration between Cornell University, Oxford University, and the local 
Ministry of Scientific Research (FOFIFA).    12
All three surveys focus on agricultural traders at both the wholesaler and retailer 
level.
4  Survey sites are market towns active in agricultural products. 24 markets were 
selected in Benin, 30 in Madagascar, and 40 markets in Malawi based on their trade 
importance and the availability of secondary price data. Due to the absence of reliable 
census information on the population of traders in both countries, a census of traders was 
conducted in each selected market. 
In Benin, the survey team counted all traders present on the market in a given day. 
This count was supplemented by lists of traders obtained from the ONASA (Office 
National d’Appui ￿ la SØcuritØ Alimentaire) and the regional bureaus of the Ministry of 
Commerce. These lists include larger traders who need not have a stall on the market 
itself. The two lists and the count were combined to construct a frame from which a 
sample was randomly drawn, resulting in a total sample of 663 agricultural traders. 
In Malawi, a reconnaissance survey of traders was conducted in July-August 1999 
to count and identify traders according to their status (independent, buying agent, or 
selling agent), their level (retail or wholesale), and the types of products they trade. The 
information on the name, type, and location of traders from the reconnaissance survey 
                                                 
4 Efforts to include agricultural inputs and cash crops into the survey were largely unsucessful. In Benin, it 
became clear early on that fertilizer and seed trade are closely linked to the production of cotton. Cotton 
marketing is under the monopoly of a parastatal enterprise, the SocietØ Nationale de Promotion Agricole 
(SONAPRA). Input trading is done primarily through village cooperatives called Groupements Villageois 
(GV), rather than by individual traders. The GVs purchase inputs from 9 government-licensed fertilizer 
importers and distribute these inputs among their members. The marketing of cotton, the dominant export 
crop, goes entirely through SONAPRA. 
In the case of Malawi, the distribution of fertilizer and other agricultural inputs is dominated by few 
very large firms, such as OPTICHEM and Norsk/Hydro. Inputs are distributed throughout the country by 
traders operating as selling agents for large corporations. A specific survey was organized for these selling 
agents, who do not conduct purchases, but who do sell independently. Results are not discussed here. A 
handfull of independent tobacco traders are recorded in the Malawi survey.   13
were entered into a spreadsheet and the sample was drawn randomly from the census data 
using a computer algorithm. A total sample of 738 traders was interviewed in Malawi. 
In Madagascar, three main agricultural regions were selected (Fianarantsoa, 
Majunga, and Antananarivo) and the sampling frame within these regions was set up as 
follows. Traders were surveyed in three different types of location: big and small urban 
markets in the main town of every province (faritany) and district (fivondronana); urban 
areas outside urban markets; and rural markets at the level of the rural county (firaisana). 
Rural firaisanas were selected through stratified sampling based on agro-ecological 
characteristics so as to be representative of the various kinds of marketed products and 
marketing seasons. Traders operating in urban markets are mostly wholesalers, semi-
wholesalers, and retailers. Urban traders located outside regular markets are bigger 
traders, processors (e.g., rice millers) and wholesalers. Traders operating on rural markets 
are mostly big and small assemblers and itinerant traders. A first trader survey was 
undertaken in 1997 in the same location. Only 30% of the surveyed 1997 traders were 
still operating in 2001. The 2001 sample is constructed so as to be representative of the 
trader population in 2001. 
The questionnaire covers the following main areas: (a) characteristics of the trader 
and trading enterprise; (b) factors of productions and operating costs; (c) trading activities 
and marketing costs; (d) relationships and coordination costs. Data were also collected on 
search behavior and costs, quality inspection, contract enforcement and dispute 
settlement, information, and property rights enforcement. 
   14
5.  MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF SURVEYED TRADERS 
 
The main characteristics of surveyed traders are summarized in Table 1. A more 
detailed description of traders in Benin and Malawi can be found in Gabre-Madhin, 
Fafchamps, Kachule, Soule & Khan (2001) and Fafchamps & Gabre-Madhin (2001).  
The overwhelming majority of independent trading enterprises are held in sole ownership 
by a local resident who is also a national of the country studied. Most of the surveyed 
traders are women. Madagascar traders are on average much better educated than Benin 
traders, with Malawian traders in between. 
FIRM ASSETS 
The money traders use to purchase agricultural products and pay marketing costs is 
fairly large by the standards of the countries concerned. The median is much smaller, 
however. Most working capital comes from internal sources. The only source of external 
finance that is used by a sizeable proportion of respondents is loans from friends and 
relatives. Surveyed traders appear surprisingly unequipped. The overwhelming majority 
of them do not own (serious) weighting equipment, transportation, or storage facilities. 
Only 3% of the total sample has a telephone. In terms of value, vehicles are the most 
important equipment item. But ownership of vehicles is heavily concentrated, with a 
large proportion of surveyed traders without vehicles. Apart from the trader himself or 
herself, surveyed enterprises do not employ an abundant manpower. Non-family 
employees only account for a small fraction of manpower. Wages paid are very low. A 
large proportion of family workers receive no wage. In contrast, non-family workers 
nearly always receive a wage.  15
 
Table 1￿Main characteristics of surveyed business 
 
 
Unit       Benin    Madagascar        Malawi
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Characteristics of trader
       Percent of women percent 81% 61% 36%
       Years of schooling # of years 2 0 8.4 9 5.6 6
       Working capital US dollars 1470 333 4182 154 560 136
       Loans from friends and relatives percent receiving 9% 9% 21%
       Percent with telephone percent 4% 4% 2%
       Percent with motorized vehicle percent 15% 8% 6%
       Manpower number of people 2.1 1 1.9 1.00         1.6 1
Last transaction
       Quantity purchased kg 2489 1000 1584 240 2485 420
       Value of the last purchase US dollars 435 159 329 62 417 102
       Distance of Purchase to sales market km 69 23 39 1 53 15
       Days since last purchase days 22 8 11 7 8 3
       Gross margin rate (1) percent 23% 18% 32% 14% 53% 40%
       Marketing costs, of which : US dollars/ton 18 15 11 2 31 21
            transport costs US dollars/ton 11 10 5 0 15 12
            personal travel costs US dollars/ton 3 1 4 0 10 1
            bagging costs US dollars/ton 2 1 0 0 2 1
            taxes and fees US dollars/ton 0.4 0 1 0 0.9 0
       Marketing costs/purchase price percent 13% 10% 5% 1% 17% 9%
       Net Margin rate (2) percent 11% 8 27% 11% 37% 27%
Annual sales
       Value of annual purchases US dollars/year 14493 4242 30903 7514 32807 4378
       Value of annual sales US dollars/year 18321 5316 41648 8617 43705 6759
        Annual sales - annual purchases US dollars/year 3828 825 11419 792 10898 1741
        Value sales/value purchases - 1 percent 22% 20% 27% 17% 49% 39%
Operating costs
        Rental of shop or storage facility US dollars/year 70 0 170 0 19 0
        Pest control US dollars/year 107 0 47 0 21 0
        Electricity US dollars/year 107 7 0 1 00
       Telephone US dollars/year 20 0 44 0 5 0
       Maintenance of vehicles US dollars/year 300 0 58 0 46 0
       Vehicle insurance US dollars/year 25 0 36 0 5 0
       Fees and market taxes US dollars/year 3 009 21 0 6 9 5 0
       Income Tax on trading activity US dollars/year 101 3 0 1 50
       Wages  US dollars/year 53 0 122 0 111 0
       Theft US dollars/year 22 0 10 0 22 0
Return to unpaid factors
        Total marketing costs (estimated) US dollars/year 2088 389 1768 66 9257 397
        Total operating costs US dollars/year 615 26 946 97 324 83
         Return to unpaid factors US dollars/year 1762 116 9345 472 3108 1147
         Return/Value of annual purchases percent 4% 7% 10% 9% 34% 25%
Number of observation (varies somewhat across variables) 641 894 732
(1) Gross margin rate = sale price/purchase price - 1
(2) Gross margin/rate = (sale price-marketing costs)/purchase price-1  16
MARGINS  
Information was collected on the last transaction undertaken by respondents. A 
’transaction’ is essentially a load that is assembled by the trader in the supply market, 
transported to the sales market, and sold over a period of time. On average, the quantity 
purchased is remarkably similar across the countries: around 2.5 metric tons of 
agricultural produce in Benin and Malawi, 1.6 metric tons in Madagascar. The value is 
also surprisingly similar. The average distance between the purchase and sale market is 
between 40 and 70km. Median distances are shorter, however: most agricultural traders 
travel very short distances to their supply market. The median number of days elapsed 
since the last purchase is equally short: it varies between one week in Benin and 
Madagascar to three days in Malawi. The majority of traders keep the products they sell 
for a short period only, typically the time it takes to sell the batch of purchased goods. 
Very few traders store agricultural products for more than a month. 
In the table, we report the gross margin rate /1
gs a
ii i pp µ = − . Ultimately, this ratio 
determines the gap between producer and consumer price and hence the efficiency of 
market intermediation. As is common in African agricultural markets, we see that the 
gross margin rate among surveyed traders is quite high -- on average, the sales price is 
23% higher than the purchase price in Benin, 53% higher in Malawi. Gross margins on 
the last purchase also vary widely. Close to 3% of surveyed traders report selling at or 
below the purchase price. At the other end of the spectrum, some trader￿s reports selling 
at close to 10 times the purchase price.    17
Gross margin rates differ widely across the three countries. What does this imply 
for the spread between producer and consumer prices? The answer to this question 
depends on the number of times an agricultural commodity changes hands before 
reaching the consumer. Although we cannot estimate this number directly, we can 
venture a guess on the basis of the composition of the sample with respect to marketing 
task  i f . 
 
MARKET STRUCTURE 
There are basically four categories of traders in our surveys: those who buy from 
and sell to traders (’wholesalers’); those who buy from farmers but sell to traders 
(’collectors’); those who buy from traders but sell to consumers (’retailers’); and those who 
buy from farmers and sell to consumers (’collector-retailers’ -- the omitted category.). The 
three countries differ markedly regarding the respective proportions of sampled traders 
falling in these four categories (Table 2). In Benin, close to half the sample is made of 
collectors who sell to other traders. Wholesalers represent one third of the sample. The 
smallest category is collector-retailers. By contrast, more than half the sample in Malawi 
is made of collector-retailers; the next most important category is collectors. This means 
that, in Benin, close to half sampled traders source their products from other traders. Only 
15\% do so in Malawi, implying that vertical integration across the marketing chain is 
more developed in Malawi. Madagascar occupies an intermediate situation.   18
Table 2￿Categories of Traders 
                
                
                   Benin       Madagascar          Malawi 
             
Collector-retailers   65 11% 202 23%  367  56%
Collectors     263 45% 133 15%  194  29%
Retailers     78 13% 332 37%  77  12%
Wholesalers   175 30% 220 25%  22  3%
Number of valid observation  581  894   660  
                          
 
Using the proportion of traders falling in different categories, we construct an 
(somewhat heroic) estimate of the average number of transactions between farmer and 
consumer.
5 We obtain an average of 3.4 transactions in Benin, 2.4 transactions in 
Madagascar, and 2 transactions in Malawi. Differences are primarily due to the 
proportion of traders who buy from farmers and sell directly to consumers. These 
estimates can then be used to guess the average spread between producer and consumer 
price. The lower number of transactions in Malawi implies that this spread need not be 
larger than in Benin even though the average margin is higher. We have seen in Table 1 
that the gross margin rates are 23% in Benin, 32% in Madagascar, and 53% in Malawi. If 
all traders charge the average margin, the consumer price in Benin would be 102% above 
the farmer price (1.23
3.4=2.02). Similar calculations for Malawi and Madagascar yield 
                                                 
5 To obtain this estimate, we reconstruct the hypothetical path of 100 purchases from farmers. Proportions 
of purchases ending in the hands of various types of traders are constructed by weighting proportions 
reported in Table 5 by volume of trade. In Benin, after reweighing, 20 purchases from farmers are sold by 
traders immediately to consumers; the others go to a second trader. In the second round of sales, 26 sales 
again go to consumers; the rest go to a third trader, etc. These calculations are conducted until all 100 
purchases have been sold to consumers. The average number of transactions is the average number of sales 
before reaching a consumer. Sensitivity analysis is conducted by experimenting with various task 
decompositions, alternative assumptions regarding sampling proportions, etc. Alternative averages differ 
slightly. Our ’best’ estimate is reported here.   19
consumer prices 134% (1.53
2=2.34) and 97% (1.32
2.4 = 1.97) above farmer prices, 
respectively.
6 These calculations, however heroic they may be, suggest that differences in 
gross margin rates across countries largely reflect different levels of vertical integration. 
 
COSTS 
Detailed information was collected on the various out-of-pocket costs incurred in 
the process of assembling, transporting, and selling the last quantities purchased. For the 
purpose of this paper, we refer to these cash outlays as marketing costs. Transport 
represents by far the largest component of marketing costs, accounting for 50-60% of the 
total. The importance of transport costs in sub-Saharan Africa has long been noted (e.g. 
Gersovitz 1989, Gersovitz 1992, Omamo 1998). The second most important component 
is the trader’s travel. This cost alone represents on average 15% of marketing costs in 
Benin, 34% in Madagascar, and 37% in Malawi. Other costs such as bagging costs and 
taxes and fees represent only a small portion of marketing costs. 
Marketing costs are small of the order of $11 to $31 per ton. Corresponding 
medians are even lower.  Marketing costs are lowest in Madagascar because the sample is 
dominated by retailers who purchase from nearby markets and thus incur little or no cash 
outlays for transport and the like. At the median, marketing costs represent 9-10% of the 
purchase price in Benin and Malawi, and only 2% in Madagascar. If we deduct marketing 
costs from the sales price, the resulting net margin rate () / 1
ns a
ii i i pc p
υ µ = −−  remains 
high: 11% on average in Benin but as high as 27% and 37% in Madagascar and Malawi, 
                                                 
6 Using medians instead yields a price gap of 76% in Benin and 96% in Malawi.   20
respectively. Medians are quite a bit lower, however, except in Malawi. These differences 
further suggest that agricultural trade may be less efficient in Malawi. 
Information was also collected on annual sales and operating costs. Survey results 
indicate that average sales per trader are higher in Malawi and Madagascar than in Benin. 
The difference between the value of sales and purchases is higher in Malawi: the selling 
price is on average 22% above the buying price in Benin and 27% in Madagascar against 
49% in Malawi. Margins vary dramatically across traders, however. Some respondents 
appear to be incurring massive losses while others make windfall profits. Part of this 
variation undoubtedly comes from measurement error because respondents do not hold 
accounts, annual sales and purchases are extrapolated on the basis of a few key 
indicators. But the variation also suggests that unit margins in agricultural trade are 
extremely volatile. 
One may surmise that higher margins in Malawi are needed to cover higher 
operating costs. This is not the case. On average, operating costs are relatively small less 
than $1000. There is also a lot of variation in their composition across countries. 
Operating costs are dominated by vehicle maintenance and insurance in Benin, storage 
and pest control in Malawi, and rental fees in Madagascar. Each of these costs is incurred 
only by a very small fraction of the trader population, as can be seen from the abundance 
of zero median values. The data also show the burden of taxation to be small: less than 
$100 a year compared to an average annual turnover measured in tens of thousands of 
dollars. While very few traders pay income tax, market fees are paid by most of them. 
For small traders, market fees are the only form of operating cost they incur. Since   21
market fees do not increase proportionally with trade volume, they affect primarily small 
to medium-size traders; they are a regressive tax. Given that transport represents such a 
large component of traders’ costs, we speculate that traders probably pay more taxes 
through gasoline taxes than through all other forms of taxation combined. 
By constructing an estimate of annual marketing costs, the data can be used to 
construct a rough estimate of the return to self-provided factors of production. This 
measure, which for simplicity we call ‘profit’, is computed as sales minus purchases, 
marketing costs, and operating costs.
7   It represents payments to self-provided factors 
such as working capital, owned storage facilities, equipment, vehicles, and unpaid labor 
by the entrepreneur and family helpers. Computed profits suffer from severe 
measurement error because they are obtained by subtracting poorly measured costs from 
poorly measured revenues. Measurement errors therefore compound themselves and 
individual measures of profit should be regarded with caution. Average profits are shown 
to be non-negligible but these figures are driven by a small number of outliers. Median 
profits provide a more accurate picture. They are much lower: $116 in Benin, $536 in 
Madagascar, and $1147 in Malawi. They correspond to a median profit rate on purchases 
of 7% in Benin, 11% in Madagascar, and 25% in Malawi.  
 
                                                 
7 Traders who derive less than 10% of their annual revenue from agricultural trader are omitted.   22
 
6.  TESTING THE EFFICIENCY OF TRANSPORT 
 
We now seek to understand the determinants of marketing costs  i c
υ. In the three 
studied countries, transport is the largest component of marketing costs. The importance 
of rural roads is a feature common to other parts of the developing world (Jacoby 2000;  
Binswanger, Khander and Rosenweig 1993) but particularly crucial in Africa (Ahmed 
and Rustagi 1987). Consequently, we begin by taking a close look at transport costs. We 
seek to uncover whether transport benefits from returns to scale. We have two reasons to 
suspect that large loads are cheaper to transport (per Kg) than small loads. First, 
conditional on the choice of vehicle, transport costs per Kg are a decreasing function of 
load size, up to the point where the vehicle is full: a half-empty truck costs more per Kg 
than a full one. Second, we suspect that small trucks are less cost efficient than large 
ones.
8 
If traders transport small loads on small, half-empty trucks, transport costs are 
higher than optimal. They could be reduced and trade efficiency could be improved by 
organizing larger loads. In contrast, if transporters efficiently pool loads from multiple 
traders, the size of an individual trader’s load should have no effect on transport cost per 
kg. Transport efficiency can thus be tested by checking whether traders who transport 
larger loads pay less per kg.  
                                                 
8 For one, over a reasonable range, the price of a truck increases less rapidly than the weight it can carry. 
Secondly, driver costs are essentially the same for a large or small truck.   23
Transport costs also depend on distance traveled. If loading (and off-loading) 
costs are negligible, transport costs are roughly proportional to distance. Over very short 
distances, however, loading costs could be large relative to total transport costs. 
Moreover, they are likely to be larger for large motorized vehicles than for carts and 
donkeys, especially if we include the time waiting for a full load to be assembled. As a 
result of loading and waiting costs, it would probably not be justified to use large trucks 
over short distances, as we would expect small trucks or even non-motorized transport 
would be cheaper.  
To test for transport efficiency, we proceed as follows. Let  ( , )
t
ii cqddenote 
transport costs per Kg. We assume:   
(,)
i u t
iii i i cqd q de
αδ θ =    (6.1) 
Where , θ α and δ are parameters to be estimated,  i q is load size,  i d  is distance, and  i u is 
an error term. If transport is inefficient, large loads cost less per Kg than small loads and 
the coefficient on load size is significantly negative. Transport efficiency thus requires 
that  0 α = . The absence of fixed transport costs with respect to distance implies  1 δ = . In 
areas with a low density of trade, more time is required to fill a large truck since the 
frequency of transactions is low. Consequently, we expect δ  to be further below 1 in low 
trade density areas.  
For each respondent, information was collected on transport costs for various 
routes and means of transportation. One fifth of surveyed traders claim not to undertake 
any transport, by which they mean that they buy and sell from the same market. The   24
others transport products across markets, nearly always with a external transporter. Most 
transport takes place in trucks, half of which are small pick-ups. Some transport takes 
place with non-motorized means of transport such as handcarts and ox-carts. Train 
transport is not used by respondents in either of the countries studied. Measured in dollars 
per ton per Km, transport costs average $0.43 in Benin, $0.70 in Malawi, and $4.60 in 
Madagascar, respectively. Transport charges vary dramatically by mode of transport, 
however. Non-motorized transport costs on average $1.78 in Benin, $1.20 in Malawi, and 
$7.96 in Madagascar. The very high figure for Madagascar is due to the high proportion 
of very short trips (i.e., a few hundred meters) in an around markets. In contrast, 
motorized transport is much cheaper. It costs on average $0.28 per ton per Km in Benin, 
$0.63 in Malawi, and $0.67 in Madagascar, respectively. There is therefore evidence that 
non-motorized transport costs much more per Kg than motorized transport. Non-
motorized transport, however, is use primarily on short distances less than 1km in 
Madagascar, 4km on average in Benin, 12km in Malawi. Large trucks are used primarily 
on long distances 120km in Malawi, 160km in Benin, 210km in Madagascar. Pick-up 
trucks are used primarily on medium distances, e.g., 25 to 70km. 
To test for returns to load size, we estimate equation 6.1 in log form. Results are 
shown on Table 3. As expected, distance traveled has a strongly significant effect on 
transport cost but δ  is significantly smaller than one in all three countries, suggesting the 
presence of large loading and offloading costs. These costs are larger in Malawi and 
Madagascar than in Benin, possibly because of the lower density of population and thus 
of agricultural trade, and thus a higher waiting time for transporters.   25
We find no evidence of returns to load size in Benin, but the load size coefficient 
is significant in Malawi and Madagascar: individual traders transporting larger loads face 
lower transport costs in these countries. Again, this might be due to the fact that 
population density is higher in Benin: as a result of increased frequency of transport, 
truckers more easily fill their vehicle with loads from multiple traders. With enough 
competition, this should ensure that Benin traders with small loads are not penalized. 
Whatever the reason, our results suggest that transport cost per Kg could be reduced in 
Malawi and Madagascar by organizing larger loads.  
Table 3￿Determinants of transport costs 
(dependent variable is the log of transport costs; estimator is OLS with robust standard errors) 
Table 3￿Determinants of transport costs 
         Benin       Madagascar         Malawi
Unit
   Distance travelled log 0.523 14.83 0.356 23.64 0.384 13.69
   Load Size log 0.006 0.45 -0.099 -5.18 -0.077 -3.85
Type of product(cereals=omitted category)
   Beans and peanuts yes=1 0.415 3.06 -0.019 -0.74 0.615 2.38
   Roots and tubers yes=1 0.658 3.68 -0.026 -0.78 0.563 2.04
   Fruits and vegetables yes=1 0.506 2.62 0.002 0.02 -0.324 -0.91
   Distance x beans and peanuts logxdum -0.072 -1.97 0.304 3.68 -0.106 -1.85
   Distance x roots and tubers logxdum -0.179 -3.87 0.399 3.08 -0.073 -1.02
   Distance x fruits and vegetables logxdum 0.034 0.68 0.071 0.27 0.260 2.59
   Intercept 0.081 0.56 3.412 29.63 1.401 8.02
Number of observations 807 770 774
R-squared 0.751 0.602 0.347
Test that distance travelled coefficient=1 F-test p-value F-test p-value F-test p-value
   Cereals 182.51 0.0000 24.07 0.0000 482.65 0.0000
   Beans and peanuts 2155.97 0.0000 15.94 0.0001 207.12 0.0000
   Roots and tubers 463.32 0.0000 3.44 0.0639 108.83 0.0000
   Fruits and vegetables 147.36 0.0000 4.90 0.0271 13.60 0.0002  26
 
To investigate these issues further, we examine whether transport costs vary by 
mode of transport. We re-estimate equation 6.1 separately for motorized and non-
motorized transport. We expect to find a large δ  and correspondingly large θ  for non-
motorized transport. For this estimation to yield meaningful results, we need to correct 
for selection bias: presumably traders choose the cheapest mode of transport available. 
To control for this possibility, we estimate a two-step self-selection model (see Maddala 
(1983), page 257-258). Let  n c  and  m c  denote the cost of non-motorized and motorized 
transport, respectively.  




























=  with 
2 () nm ar u u συ − = . A trader selects 
non-motorized transport if nm cc <  that is, if uz > . Vice versa for motorized transport. 









































=  (Maddala 1983). The above equation suggests 
a method for obtaining a consistent estimator of  n β  and  m β : regress the choice of mode   27
of transport on a vector of instruments, e.g., trader characteristics; compute the Mills 
ratios; and regress  n c  and  m c  on X and the Mills ratios.  
Results from this procedure are shown on Table 4. Instruments include trader 
characteristics that may affect the choice of transport mode. In all three countries, 
distance traveled raises the probability of using motorized transport. Self-selection has a 
strong effect on the choice of non-motorized transport in Benin: without self-selection, 
the average cost of non-motorized transport would be higher. Self-selection is also 
significant in the motorized transport regression for Madagascar. In other regressions, the 
self-selection correction is not significant. Previous results regarding load size are 
confirmed: non significant in Benin; significant and negative in Malawi and Madagascar. 
Load size has no significant effect on the choice of transport mode, but it has a strong 
negative effect on transport cost in Madagascar and Malawi.
9  
We conduct a similar analysis for the choice between small and large trucks, 
conditional on using motorized transport. Results (not shown here to save space) show 
that, in both countries, large trucks are more likely to be used on long distances. In Benin, 
they are also more used for large transactions. The self-selection correction is large and 
significant for small trucks in Malawi: if traders did not self-select away from small 
trucks, transport in small trucks would be more expensive. The same is true for large 
trucks in Madagascar. 
Taken together, our results suggest that transport follows some economic 
rationale. Motorized transport is used on longer distances when it is cheaper. But 
                                                 
9 Keep in mind that load size here refers to the load carried by the trader,not the total load on the truck, 
which often is larger because truckers combine loads from multiple traders.   28
increasing returns to load size are present in two of the three countries where traders 
transporting larger loads pay less for transport. This may be due to lower population 
density leading to a lower frequency of transactions, longer waiting time, and a higher 
likelihood that trucks do not travel full. In such an environment, traders bringing large 
loads pay less for transport. In these two countries, transport cost per kg could be 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5￿Determinants of marketing costs in Benin 





       Total
A. Conditional equation    Transport      Travel    Handling marketing costs
Transaction characteristics Unit Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat
    Transaction size log 1.034 29.600 0.031 0.860 1.078 33.190 0.928 35.380
    Distance between purchase and sale (km) log(x+1) 0.452 18.790 0.768 21.880 0.108 4.900 0.405 24.420
    Days between purchase and sale log(x+1) -0.039 -1.160 0.007 0.140 0.076 2.370 0.046 1.830
Marketing task (collector-retailer=omitted category)
    Collector yes=1 -0.009 -0.110 0.216 1.950 0.013 0.090 0.040 0.550
    Retailer yes=1 0.058 0.390 -0.088 -0.330 -0.141 -0.460 -0.566 -3.490
    Wholesaler yes=1 -0.308 -2.840 -0.058 -0.440 0.325 2.190 -0.120 -1.370
Crop type(cereals=omitted category)
    Beans and pulses yes=1 -0.066 -0.590 0.083 0.690 0.097 0.880 0.050 0.590
    Roots and tubers yes=1 -0.089 -0.760 -0.157 -1.120 0.380 2.270 -0.007 -0.060
    Fruits and vegetables yes=1 0.228 1.640 0.070 0.460 0.111 0.280 0.094 0.640
Region dummies(north=omitted category)
    Central yes=1 -0.296 -3.040 0.265 2.390 -0.331 -4.030 -0.087 -1.270
    South yes=1 -0.161 -2.280 0.218 2.440 -0.627 -7.490 -0.066 -1.060
    Intercept -6.185 -31.450 -2.744 -17.920 -7.247 -32.000 -5.039 -35.830
B. Selection equation
Transaction characteristics Unit
    Transaction size log -0.001 -0.010 -0.123 -2.150 0.219 2.260 -0.118 -0.470
    Distance between purchase and sale(km) log(x+1) 0.889 3.570 0.749 9.340 0.424 6.520 5.408 7.600
    Days between purchase sale log(x+1) -0.152 -1.190 0.022 0.300 0.138 1.680 -0.542 -2.360
Marketing task(collector-retailer=omitted category)
    Collector yes=1 1.112 2.640 0.105 0.320 1.511 5.370 1.860 3.190
    Retailer yes=1 1.029 2.250 -1.202 -2.700 0.369 1.160 1.095 1.840
   Wholesaler yes=1 1.372 2.850 -0.046 -0.150 1.159 4.150 9.229 7.440
Crop type(cereals=omitted category)
    Beans and pulses yes=1 0.414 1.410 -0.807 -2.940 0.097 0.350 8.082 10.650
    Roots and tubers yes=1 0.486 1.220 -0.829 -3.640 -0.989 -2.930 0.067 0.120
    Fruits and vegetables yes=1 -0.170 -0.420 -0.568 -2.130 -1.061 -2.490 0.371 0.620
Regions dummies (north=omitted category)
    Central yes=1 -0.102 -0.330 0.709 2.950 -0.690 -2.900 -0.184 -0.330
    South yes=1 -0.379 -1.050 1.683 5.260 -0.587 -2.170 0.222 0.420
Trader characteristics(selection instruments)
    Working capital log 0.369 2.810 -0.280 -3.110 -0.075 -0.830 0.713 2.730
    value of transport vehicles log(x+1) -0.142 -2.200 -0.017 -3.010 -0.005 -0.110 -0.091 -0.830
    Capacity of storage facilities log(x+1) 0.067 2.050 0.087 12.500 -0.068 -2.260 -0.024 -0.380
    Number of business contacts log -0.032 -0.350 0.139 2.390 -0.293 -3.890 -0.528 -2.360
    Gender female=1 0.383 0.830 0.716 12.790 0.269 0.870 0.271 0.460
    Intercept -2.482 -2.490 -1.403 -0.753 -1.140 -0.509 -0.390
    /athrho -0.501 -2.530 16.311 488.050 0.312 2.200 -0.047 -0.300
    /Insigma -0.382 -6.940 -0.473 -6.250 -0.444 -9.670 -0.607 -11.860
    rho -0.463 -0.711 1.000 1.000 0.303 0.034 -0.047 -0.342
    sigma 0.683 0.613 0.623 0.537 0.641 0.586 0.545 0.493
    lambda -0.316 -0.535 0.623 0.531 0.194 0.032 -0.026 -0.194
    Number of observations 477 477 477 477
     of which uncensored 433 268 380 459
F-stat. p.value F-stat. p.value F-stat. p.value F-stat. p.value
    Test if coef. of transaction size = 1 0.94 0.3332 729.16 0.0000 5.75 0.0164 7.56 0.0060  31
7.  INCREASING RETURNS TO TRANSACTION SIZE 
 
We have investigated whether returns to load size are present in transport. We 
wish to ascertain whether there are increasing returns to transaction size. One possible 
source of increasing returns is if traders who operate on a larger scale are able to offer a 
lower consumer price or a higher producer price. If this were true, the gross margin rate 
g
i µ  would be a decreasing function of transaction size  i q . Another possibility would be 
that marketing costs would be lower for large transactions. In this case, total marketing 
costs  i c
υwould decrease with transaction size  i q . If large transactions have both a lower 
g
i µ  and lower  i c
υ, it would be interesting to know whether they have the same 
n
i u , in 
which case we could say that cost savings resulting from larger transactions are passed 
onto consumers and producers. 
We now turn to total marketing costs  i c
υ and marketing margin rates 
g
i µ  and 
n
i µ . 
We have seen that agricultural traders vary dramatically in size and profitability. We also 
noted very large differences in margins and costs across the three countries. The question 
we now ask is whether returns to scale or economies of scope are present and whether 
their presence can account for differences across traders and countries. 
We focus on the costs and margins relative to the last recorded transaction. This is an 
appropriate level of analysis for two reasons. First, it is the level at which we can contrast 
selling and buying price. The difference between these two prices is the ultimate 
yardstick of trading efficiency: the smaller the difference is, the more welfare for   32
producers and consumers. Second, it is the level at which we can best examine marketing 




To investigate these ideas, we first estimate kernel regressions of marketing costs 
i c
υ expressed in US$ per Kg. Results are summarized in Figure 1. We find that personal 
travel costs per kilogram fall dramatically with transaction size. This is anticipated since 
travel costs do not depend on the quantities purchased. In contrast, handling costs (mostly 
bagging) increase with transaction size in Benin and Malawi, presumably because in 
small transactions handling is done directly by the trader and is not costed. Transportation 
costs display a mostly positive relationship with transaction size. This is because many 
small transactions do not incur transport expenses: retailers purchase small quantities 
from a wholesaler for sale in the same town or market. As a result of personal travel 
costs, a negative relationship between transaction size and marketing costs obtains in 
Malawi. In Madagascar, marketing costs show little relationship with transaction size 
while in Benin they tend to increase. 
The above univariate analysis is subject to omitted variable bias as it ignores the 
effect of other factors that affect costs. We therefore turn to multivariate analysis and add 
regressors to control for the distance between point of purchase and point of sale  i d , the 
duration of storage  i s , and the marketing task  i f . Crop and region dummies are included 
as well. We expect marketing costs to be higher for long distance purchases because of 
transport and personal travel costs and when storage duration is longer to cover storage   33
costs. With respect to marketing task  i f , we follow Table 2 and distinguish between 
wholesalers, collectors, retailers, and collector-retailers’ the omitted category. We expect 
traders who straddle more than one function to incur higher marketing costs. 
Results are presented in Tables 5 (Benin), 6 (Madagascar), and 7 (Malawi). To 
control for self-selection, we rely on a Heckman procedure. The log of marketing costs is 
the dependent variable, conditional on a cost being incurred. Trader characteristics such 
as gender, number of vehicles, working capital, storage capacity, and number of business 
contacts serve as instruments in the selection equation.
10 
As before, our main objective is to test whether marketing costs increase 
proportionally with transaction size. We find that, conditional on being incurred, all 
marketing costs except personal travel are roughly proportional to transaction size. 
However, in all cases except one, we can reject the hypothesis that marketing costs are 
exactly proportional to transaction size: the coefficient of transaction size is significantly 
smaller than 1 in all three countries. The results therefore suggest the presence of 
increasing returns to transaction size.  
Among the other results of interest is the strong and robust effect of distance: both 
the probability of incurring marketing costs and the amounts incurred increase with 
distance. The effect is strong and significant in all cases. The length of time elapsed 
between purchase and sale has no systematic effect on marketing costs. Turning to 
marketing tasks, results are contrasted between the three countries. In Benin, collector-
                                                 
10 The choice of instruments is motivated as follows. Owning a vehicle reduces the probability of relying on 
hired transporters. But when external transport is used and out-of-pocket transport charges are incurred, it 
should not affect transport cost. Being a woman might reduce the probability of personal travel due to 
parenting responsibilities and the like. But conditional on traveling, it should not affect travel costs.   34
retailers have a lower likelihood of incurring marketing costs, particularly for transport 
and handling. This suggests that they might operate in a different manner. Closer 
examination of the data, however, reveals that Benin collector-retailers (of which there 
are 65 in the sample) do not significantly differ from other traders regarding transaction 
size, distance, length of storage, or number of vehicles owned. Conditional on incurring 
marketing costs, collector-retailers incur costs similar to other categories. Other results of 
interest are that retailers are less likely to incur personal travel costs and handling 
charges, probably because they travel much shorter distances to their source of supply. 
   35
Table 6￿Determinants of marketing costs in Madagascar 
(dependent variable is log of marketing cotst, Heckman maximum likelihood estimator) 
 
Note: Handling costs omitted from this table because too few uncensored observation (19).  
 
        Total
A. Conditional equation      Transport        Travel Marketing costs
Transaction characteristics Unit Coef. z stat. Coef. z stat. Coef. z stat.
    Transaction size log 0.719 13.16 0.105 1.39 0.656 12.59
    Distance between purchase and sale (km) log(x+1) 0.494 12.07 0.576 9.07 0.572 14.08
    Days between purchase and sale log(x+1) -0.077 -1.00 0.140 1.37 -0.039 -0.49
Marketing task (collector-retailer=omitted category)
    Collector yes=1 0.290 1.15 -0.004 -0.02 0.417 1.75
    Retailer yes=1 0.078 0.40 -0.167 -0.70 0.190 0.95
    Wholesaler yes=1 -0.165 -0.74 -0.368 -1.23 -0.198 -0.89
Crop type(cereals=omitted category)
    Beans and pulses yes=1 -0.052 -0.32 0.264 1.15 0.227 1.47
    Roots and tubers yes=1 0.252 1.43 0.120 0.61 0.313 1.75
    Fruits and vegetables yes=1 -0.032 -0.05 1.319 1.42 1.192 5.39
Region dummies(north=omitted category)
    Central yes=1 0.471 3.09 0.558 2.10        0.537 3.16
    South yes=1 0.358 2.29 0.213 1.02 0.575 3.63
    Intercept 3.344 9.75 6.151 12.67 3.644 9.55
B. Selection equation Unit
Transaction characteristics
    Transaction size log 0.119 1.51 -0.038 -0.59 0.327 4.50         
    Distance between purchase and sale(km) log(x+1) 0.337 6.09 0.338 8.38 0.230 4.32
    Days between purchase sale log(x+1) -0.027 -0.30 0.019 0.25 -0.214 -2.17
Marketing task(collector-retailer=omitted category)
    Collector yes=1 0.342 1.39 -0.018 -0.07 -0.337 -1.15
    Retailer yes=1 0.765 4.46 0.197 1.06 0.238 0.99
   Wholesaler yes=1 0.567 2.41 -0.182 -0.77 -0.074 -0.27
Crop type(cereals=omitted category)
    Beans and pulses yes=1 -0.404 -2.46 -0.306 -1.72 -0.194 -1.11
    Roots and tubers yes=1 -0.134 -0.66 0.133 0.67 0.055 0.23
    Fruits and vegetables yes=1 13.957 0.896 1.34 4.269 2.15
Regions dummies (north=omitted category)
    Central yes=1 0.375 2.05 0.239 1.30        0.485 2.27         
    South yes=1 -0.102 -0.65 0.570 3.41 0.291 1.70         
Trader characteristics(selection instruments)
    Working capital log -0.043 -0.76 0.012 0.19 -0.186 -3.30
    value of transport vehicles log(x+1) -0.024 -2.43 -0.034 -2.86 -0.019 -1.80
    Capacity of storage facilities log(x+1) -0.032 -1.12 -0.019 -0.66 -0.031 -0.99
    Number of business contacts log 0.138 1.75 -0.154 -1.66 0.161 1.66
    Gender female=1 0.058 0.53 -0.015 -0.12 0.089 0.70
    Intercept -0.320 -0.49 -0.935 -1.22 1.500 2.26
    /athrho 0.954 3.32 0.141 0.82 1.048 2.17
    /Insigma 0.128 1.80 -0.041 -0.54 0.200 2.56
    rho 0.742 0.140 0.781
    sigma 1.137 0.960 1.222
    lambda 0.843 0.135 0.954
    Number of observations 665 665 665
     of which uncensored 501 175 551
F-stat p-value F-stat p-value F-stat p-value
    Test if coef. of transaction size = 1 26.48 0.0000 141.8 0.0000 43.42 0.0000  36
Table 7￿Determinants of marketing costs in Malawi 




        Total
A. Conditional equation      Transport        Travel      Handling Marketing costs
Transaction characteristics Unit Coef. t stat. Coef. t stat. Coef. t stat. Coef. t stat.
    Transaction size log 0.914 25.240 0.084 2.030 1.222 24.330 0.918 20.070
    Distance between purchase and sale (km) log(x+1) 0.285 7.280 0.547 8.750 0.077 2.460 0.619 18.630
    Days between purchase and sale log(x+1) 0.066 1.500 0.062 1.170 -0.149 -2.050 0.045 0.730
Marketing task (collector-retailer=omitted category)
    Collector yes=1 -0.284 -2.430 0.253 1.820 0.075 0.500 -0.255 -1.970
    Retailer yes=1 -0.161 -1.440 0.082 0.850 0.431 2.290 -0.050 -0.310
    Wholesaler yes=1 0.021 0.130 0.348 1.510 0.367 1.720 -0.036 -0.190
Crop type(cereals=omitted category)
    Beans and pulses yes=1 0.154 1.450 0.239 1.960 0.239 1.640 0.154 1.030
    Roots and tubers yes=1 0.225 1.970 0.081 0.550 0.267 1.740 -0.036 -0.210
    Fruits and vegetables yes=1 0.719 3.060 0.295 1.140 1.837 7.630 1.124 4.810
Region dummies(north=omitted category)
    Central yes=1 -0.005 -0.050 -0.194 -1.650 0.212 1.410 -0.133 -1.060
    South yes=1 0.113 1.090 0.234 1.980 0.423 3.250 0.047 0.330
    Intercept -4.847 -17.810 -1.793 -6.510 -8.185 -29.880 -5.572 -17.570
B. Selection equation
Transaction characteristics
    Transaction size log 0.166 1.790 0.008 0.070 -0.248 -3.260 -0.123 -1.370
    Distance between purchase and sale(km) log(x+1) 0.638 10.460 1.445 8.690 0.062 1.000 0.221 3.660
    Days between purchase sale log(x+1) 0.122 1.250 -0.008 -0.060 0.515 4.840 0.285 2.360
Marketing task(collector-retailer=omitted category)
    Collector yes=1 -0.547 -2.170 -0.475 -1.300 0.346 1.670 -0.258 -1.180
    Retailer yes=1 -0.074 -0.280 0.241 0.990 -0.599 -2.360 -0.517 -2.000
   Wholesaler yes=1 -0.605 -1.340 -0.791 -1.190 0.166 0.390 5.310 21.870
Crop type(cereals=omitted category)
    Beans and pulses yes=1 0.041 0.170 -0.095 -0.320 -0.192 -0.940 0.027 0.100
    Roots and tubers yes=1 -0.041 -0.160 -0.804 -2.220 0.255 1.080 0.231 0.780
    Fruits and vegetables yes=1 1.067 1.920 -1.451 -2.490 -0.986 -3.460 0.166 0.400
Regions dummies (north=omitted category)
    Central yes=1 -0.195 -1.080 -0.915 -2.770 -0.781 -4.240 -0.483 -2.440
    South yes=1 0.135 0.430 -0.184 -0.760 -0.514 -2.180 -0.039 -0.130
Trader characteristics(selection instruments)
    Working capital log -0.042 -0.420 -0.200 -1.320 0.065 0.810 -0.001 -0.010
    value of transport vehicles log(x+1) -0.007 -0.150 0.122 -1.990 0.027 0.800 0.009 0.180
    Capacity of storage facilities log(x+1) 0.034 1.110 0.073 1.590 0.020 1.020 0.042 1.490
    Number of business contacts log 0.244 2.540 -0.018 -0.120 -0.245 -2.500 0.003 0.030
    Gender female=1 0.081 0.410 -1.078 -3.250 -0.074 -0.420 -0.273 -1.060
    Intercept -2.427 -4.140 -0.827 -1.090 2.461 4.800 1.528 2.530
    /athrho 0.013 0.090 0.265 1.670 -1.287 -2.360 -0.001 -0.010
    /Insigma -0.353 -7.070 -0.253 -3.300 0.081 1.180 0.070 1.830
    rho 0.013 -0.254 0.259 -0.046 -0.858 -0.982 -0.001 -0.179
    sigma 0.702 0.637 0.776 0.668 1.085 0.947 1.073 0.995
    lambda 0.009 0.182 0.201 -0.020 -0.931 -1.348 -0.001 -0.194
    Number of observations 532 532 532 532
     of which uncensored 374 319 449 491
    Test if coef. of transaction size = 1 5.66 0.0173 494.10 0.0000 19.55 0.0000 3.22 0.0727  37
Figure 1￿Costs and Transaction Size 
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MARGIN RATES 
 
We have found evidence of increasing returns to transaction size in marketing 
costs. We now investigate whether these results carry over to gross and net margins. We 
again begin by estimating kernel regressions of margin rates on transaction size. Results 
are summarized in Figure 2. Six curves are shown, two for Benin, two for Madagascar, 
and two for Malawi, together with their 95% confidence interval. In all cases, the upper 
curve is the gross margin rate 
g
i µ  and the lower curve is the net margin rate 
n
i µ . For 
Benin and Madagascar, we find no evidence that margins decrease with transaction size; 
if anything, we see a slight increase. In Malawi, results suggest that, beyond a certain 
threshold, margins drop with transaction size. This is particularly true for the net margin 
rate.
11 At prima facie, therefore, we find little evidence of increasing returns to 
transaction size.  
 Univariate analysis is subject to omitted variable bias since it fails to take into 
account other factors that affect margins and costs. To control for these effects, we add 
regressors for the distance between point of purchase and point of sale  i d , the duration of 
storage  i s , and the marketing task  i f . We expect the gross margin rate to be higher for 
long distance purchases because of transport and personal travel costs. On average, the 
gross margin rate should be higher when storage duration is longer, if only to cover 
storage costs. Controls are also added to account for differences across crops and regions. 
Because margin rates are sensitive to measurement error, we minimize the effect of 
                                                 
11 Some of the details of Figure 1 are not robust to alternative definitions of margins. For instance, if we use 
unit margins in US$ per Kg instead of margin rates, we observe a rapid drop in Malawi. In contrast, if we 
use the log of margin rates, non-linear patterns become more accentuated in both countries. What is robust 
across methods is that margins fall in Malawi beyond a given threshold while they rise slightly in Benin.   39
outliers by using median regression and by redefining the dependent variable as 
log( 1)
n
i µ + and log ( 1)
n
i µ + . 
Results, summarized in Table 8 for gross margin rates, confirm univariate results 
regarding the effect of transaction size: gross margin rates are constant in Benin and 
Madagascar but fall with transaction size in Malawi. Put differently, traders operating on 
a larger scale in Malawi offer better prices to producers and consumers. The magnitude 
of the effect is small, however: a tenfold increase in transaction size from the median of 
$102 would reduce the gross margin by 0.2 percentage points. Albeit the spread between 
producer and consumer price could be reduced if traders in Malawi operated at a larger 
scale, this effect would be small. 
Results for net margin rates are presented in Table 9. We see that, after deduction 
of marketing costs, transaction size has no significant effect on margin rates in either of 
the three countries. Although we found marketing costs to decrease with transaction size, 
the effect is not strong enough to generate a negative relationship between net margin 
rates and transaction size: traders who buy in larger quantities do not, on average, have 
significantly higher net margin rates. 
Other results of interest from the two Tables are that, in agreement with 
expectations,
g
i µ  increase with distance traveled and storage duration. The effect is strong 
and significant in both countries. Once marketing costs are deducted, however, margins 
in Benin and Malawi fall with distance while storage duration is no longer significant. 
This suggests that, in these two countries, transport costs increase faster with distance   40
than purchase prices fall. In Madagascar, distance and storage duration remain positive 
and significant. 
 
8.  INCREASING RETURNS TO SCOPE OF ACTIVITIES 
 
We now address whether increasing returns to scope of activities, that is, by the 
extent of marketing tasks undertaken, are present.  The regressions of Tables 8 and 9 also 
throw some light on differentiation by task. We expect collector-retailers to have higher 
margins than other traders because they bypass the middlemen; consequently, they should 
combine the collector￿s, wholesaler’s and retailer’s margins. By the same reasoning, 
wholesalers are expected to have the smallest margin rate since they perform fewer 
marketing functions. Once we deduct marketing costs, we expect these differences to 
decrease since involvement in multiple tasks also raises costs. As expected, collector-
retailers have significantly higher margin rates than other traders. At the other hand of the 
spectrum, wholesalers have the smallest margin rates in all three countries. Once 
marketing costs are deducted, however, differences are no longer significant, except for 
collectors in Malawi, who continue to have lower margins than other traders, and for 
wholesalers and retailers in Malawi. The exception for collectors in Malawi is probably 
due to the way collectors operate: in contrast to Benin where collectors go back and forth 
between supply and purchase markets, incurring some transport costs in the process, 
Malawian collectors ’sit’ in their supply village and incur fewer transport costs.   41
Figure 2￿Margins and Transaction Size 
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TTa 
Table 8￿Determinants of Gross Margin Rates 
(dependent variable is log of sales price/purchase price ration; median regression) 




minants of Net Margin Rates 
        Benin    Madagascar      Malawi
Transaction characteristics Unit Coef. t stat. Coef. t stat. Coef. t stat.
   Transaction size log 0.001 0.440 -0.002 -1.610 -0.007 -2.950
   Distance between purchase and sale (km) log(x+1) 0.004 4.240 0.011 10.650 0.006 4.300
   Days between purchase and sale log(x+1) 0.005 2.870 0.013 5.930 0.011 3.440
Marketing task (collector-retailer=omitted category)
   Collector yes=1 -0.001 -0.210 0.009 1.470 -0.033 -4.310
   Retailer  yes=1 -0.019 -2.810 -0.019 -4.720 -0.019 -2.130
   Wholesaler  yes=1 -0.025 -4.250 -0.025 -4.470 -0.036 -2.500
Crop type (cereals=omitted category)
   Beans and pulses yes=1 -0.015 -3.050 -0.001 -0.170 0.018 2.340
   Roots and tubers yes=1 0.006 1.070 0.058 11.760 0.111 13.270
   Fruits and vegetables yes=1 0.014 2.010 0.012 0.570 0.039 2.770
Region dummies (north=omitted category)
   Central yes=1 0.018 4.360 -0.037 -8.630 0.003 0.470
   South yes=1 0.021 5.500 -0.038 -10.040 0.008 0.970
   Intercept 0.054 5.990 0.079 10.750 0.139 9.400
Number of observations 517 865 518
Pseudo R-squared 0.114 0.182 0.155  43
 
Table 9￿Determinants of Net Margin Rates 








    Benin  Madagascar     Malawi
Transaction characteristics Unit Coef. t stat. Coef. t stat. Coef. t stat.
   Transaction size log 0.001 0.350 0.002 1.170 0.005 1.360
   Distance between purchase and sale (km) log(x+1) -0.025 -12.670 0.007 6.020 -0.017 -7.400
   Days between purchase and sale log(x+1) 0.002 0.530 0.018 7.510 0.000 -0.010
Marketing task (collector-retailer=omitted category)
   Collector yes=1 -0.010 -0.850 -0.011 -1.520 -0.032 -2.640
   Retailer  yes=1 0.000 0.020 -0.024 -5.390 -0.001 -0.090
   Wholesaler  yes=1 -0.019 -1.460 -0.030 -4.920 0.007 0.320
Crop type (cereals=omitted category)
   Beans and pulses yes=1 0.021 1.910 0.001 0.200 0.074 6.010
   Roots and tubers yes=1 0.000 0.030 0.056 10.640 0.072 5.600
   Fruits and vegetables yes=1 0.007 0.470 -0.074 -3.300 0.072 3.330
Region dummies (north=omitted category)
   Central yes=1 -0.008 -0.870 -0.034 -7.330 0.029 2.860
   South yes=1 0.010 1.270 -0.036 -8.870 0.029 2.330
   Intercept 0.039 1.970 0.044 5.500 0.035 1.490
Number of observations 516 848 502
Pseudo R-squared 0.231 0.125 0.097  44
 
To further investigate the relationship between margins, transaction size, and 
marketing tasks, we estimate similar regressions for purchase and sales price 
s
i p  and 
a
i p  
(in logs). We expect traders who purchase directly from farmers to pay less. By the same 
token, we expect traders who sell to consumers to charge more. The presence of quantity 
discounts (lower purchase prices and higher sales prices) might again suggest the 
existence of returns to transaction size. 
Results shown on Table 10 indicate the presence of large quantity discounts in 
Malawi and Madagascar. Such discounts are not present in Benin. But the discounts go in 
the same direction for purchase and sales price: traders who purchase larger quantities 
pay less per Kg but sell for less as well.  
As expected, retailers and wholesalers pay more for the products they purchase. 
The effect is strong and significant in all three countries. Contrary to expectations, 
however, we do not find that retailers and collector-retailers sell at a higher price. In 
Benin and Madagascar, retailers and wholesalers sell at a higher price than collectors and 
collector-retailers. In Malawi, collectors receive a lower price than other traders, but 
wholesalers charge a price that is not significantly different from that of retailers and 
collector-retailers. These results are not due to transaction size, distance, or storage 
effects: omitting these variables from the regression leads to similar qualitative results. 
One possible explanation for these puzzling results is that the boundary between 
wholesale and retail is blurred, as the overwhelming majority of respondents who 
describe themselves as wholesalers also operate as retailers.   45
 
9. RETURNS  TO  SIZE  OF BUSINESS ASSETS 
 
The analysis conducted until now focused on the gap between buying and selling 
prices for the last transaction. We also examined marginal costs for evidence of 
increasing returns. In practice, however, returns to scale may arise not because of 
marketing margins on a specific transaction, but because of fixed factors and operating 
costs. Large traders may indeed sell at prices comparable to small traders but make more 
profit. In this situation, large traders would have similar gross and net margin rates but 
higher profits. To investigate this possibility, we turn to information about total annual 
purchases 
a
ii p Q  and sales 
s
ii p Q  where  i Q  denotes quantity sold over the entire year. The 





ii i i VQ pp s t o c k =− + ∆  
We also consider two additional measures: value added minus operating costs (excluding 
wages) 
og f
ii i VVc ≡− ; and value-added minus both operating costs and variable marketing 
costs.  This latter measure can be defined as profits  
pg f
ii i i i VVc Q c
υ ≡− − .  
 
                                                 
12 Because stocks are minimal, results are insensitive to the correction for changes in stock.   46
In principle, 
p
i V  is a better measure of returns to fixed factors, but it is subject to 
more measurement error. We also lose a lot of observations for which, after 
subtracting  ii cQ
υ  and 
f
i c , and  ,
fp
ii cVbecomes negative. 
We estimate an equation of the form:  
i u g
ii i i i Va K L N H e
αβ γ θ =  
Where  i K  stands for working capital,  i L  is labor,  i N  is social network capital, and  i H  is 
human capital. We estimate the above regression in logs with our three measures of 
,,
g o
ii VV and 
p
i V . We test for the presence of constant returns in accumulable factors, i.e., 
working capital, social network capital, and labor. A similar approach was used by 
Fafchamps & Minten (2002) and Fafchamps & Minten (2001). 
Working capital is the rotating fund of the trader. Labor is measured in total 
months worked. Social network capital is the number of traders known in supply and 
purchase markets. Human capital is captured by gender, trade experience, years of 
schooling, and number of languages spoken. To control for simultaneity bias, working 
capital, labor, and network capital are instrumented using start-up working and network 
capital, age of trader and age squared, parental experience in trade, and number of 
siblings and children aged 15 and above. Region dummies are included to control for 
location-specific effects. 
Results are presented in Table 11. Estimated coefficients are quite stable across 
regressions in spite of the loss of observations due to negative value added and missing   47
information. Value added depends primarily on working and network capital, except in 
Madagascar where network capital is not significant.
13 
In Benin and Malawi, the coefficient of labor is negative in all regressions except 
one, and it is never significant. In Madagascar, labor is positive and significant in one of 
the three regressions. Years of schooling have a negative effect on performance in both 
countries; the coefficient is significant in four out of six regressions. In Malawi, female 
traders are less productive than their male counterparts; in the other two countries, there 
is no significant difference. 
The presence of constant returns in working capital and labor alone is mildly 
rejected in only two of the three regressions in Benin. But it can no longer be rejected 
once marketing costs are deducted from value added. Constant returns to scale in working 
capital, labor, and network capital cannot be rejected in all countries and all regressions. 
From this we conclude that the data show no strong evidence of increasing returns to 
scale: large traders do not obtain a systematically higher return to accumulable factors of 
production. This conclusion is particularly strong if we include network capital in the list 
of accumulable factors of production.  
                                                 
13 This is a surprising result given that work on an earlier 1997 survey showed a strong returns to network 
capital (e.g. Fafchamps & Minten 2002, Fafchamps & Minten 2001). This issue deserves more 






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 11￿Returns to Fixed Factors 
(dependent variable is log of value added; instrumental variable regression) 
 
           Gross           Minus           Minus
A. Benin Unit       value added   operating costs    marketing costs
Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat.
   Working capital(*) log 0.902 5.470 0.893 4.420 0.711 3.360
   Manpower in months worked (*) log -0.606 -1.260 -0.875 -1.590 0.007 0.010
   Network capital (*) log 0.541 5.880 0.613 5.990 0.387 2.630
   Years of schooling of trader level -0.060 -2.090 -0.057 -1.720 -0.063 -1.540
   Years of experience of trader log -0.021 -0.150 -0.066 -0.400 -0.196 -1.000
   Nber of languages spoken by traders level 0.101 1.390 0.084 1.040 0.100 1.110
   Gender of trader female=1 -0.113 -0.490 -0.217 -0.830 -0.149 -0.440
   Central region yes=1 0.348 1.740 0.232 1.030 0.281 0.980
   Southern region yes=1 0.346 1.940 0.187 0.950 -0.196 -0.850
   Intercept -0.192 -0.200 0.032 0.030 1.268 1.040
Number of observations 472 442 332
R-squared 0.358 0.275 0.242
F-stat p-value F-stat p-value F-stat p-value
Test working capital and labor jointly 18.64 0.0000 10.99 0.0000 7.16 0.0009
Test CRS in working capital and labor 3.09 0.0795 4.71 0.0305 0.20 0.6564
Test CRS in working capital, labor and contacts 0.20 0.6526 0.81 0.3675 0.04 0.8477
B. Madagascar
Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat.
   Working capital(*) log 0.425 3.500 0.418 3.140 0.448 3.440
   Manpower in months worked (*) log 0.905 1.580 1.206 2.030 0.798 1.340
   Network capital (*) log 0.008 0.060 0.044 0.290 0.095 0.640
   Years of schooling of trader level -0.017 -0.930 -0.014 -0.690 -0.011 -0.540
   Years of experience of trader log 0.118 0.650 0.012 0.060 0.084 0.450
   Nber of languages spoken by traders level 0.407 3.110 0.351 2.310 0.388 2.500
   Gender of trader female=1 0.125 0.840 0.118 0.690 0.070 0.420
   Central region yes=1 -0.816 -3.210 -0.893 -2.950 -0.751 -2.390
   Southern region yes=1 -0.522 -2.610 -0.576 -2.540 -0.537 -2.300
   Intercept 9.348 5.930 9.482 5.620 8.778 5.280
Number of observations 704 620 582
R-squared 0.410 0.379 0.426
F-stat p-value F-stat p-value F-stat p-value
Test working capital and labor jointly 16.48 0.0000 15.05 0.0000 13.62 0.0000
Test CRS in working capital and labor 0.42 0.5153 1.38 0.2409 0.21 0.6454
Test CRS in working capital, labor and contacts 0.4 0.5288 1.41 0.2361 0.39 0.5346
C. Malawi
Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat.
   Working capital(*) log 0.582 3.140 0.677 3.320 0.571 2.500
   Manpower in months worked (*) log -0.167 -0.270 -0.354 -0.540 -0.218 -0.290
   Network capital (*) log 0.562 3.850 0.655 4.020 0.669 3.600
   Years of schooling of trader level -0.016 -0.790 -0.038 -1.710 -0.061 -2.260
   Years of experience of trader log 0.096 1.130 0.068 0.720 0.086 0.800
   Nber of languages spoken by traders level -0.039 -0.580 0.030 0.400 0.016 0.190
   Gender of trader female=1 -0.407 -2.730 -0.453 -2.780 -0.504 -2.740
   Central region yes=1 0.085 0.630 0.138 0.930 0.323 1.910
   Southern region yes=1 -0.111 -0.450 -0.153 -0.570 0.081 0.280
   Intercept 3.059 3.330 2.309 2.210 2.494 2.250
Number of observations 583 565 494
R-squared 0.379 0.352 0.304
F-stat p-value F-stat p-value F-stat p-value
Test working capital and labor jointly 23.55 0.0000 22.65 0.0000 13.46 0.0000
Test CRS in working capital and labor 1.71 0.1913 1.97 0.1608 1.41 0.2349
Test CRS in working capital, labor and contacts 0.00 0.9591 0.00 0.9642 0.00 0.9686
(*) Instrumented using start-up working and network capital, age of trader and age squared, parental experience in trade, and
number of siblings and children aged 15 and above.   50
10.    CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
In this paper, we have examined how margins and marketing costs vary across 
agricultural traders in sub-Saharan Africa. We expected to find evidence of returns to 
scale, especially regarding transport and travel costs. If increasing returns exist, the 
presence of myriads of small traders would be inefficient. With increasing returns, one 
would expect certain traders to grow over time and to eventually eliminate inefficient 
small operators. But obstacles to firm growth such as poor access to capital and 
coordination failure in transport might delay the process. Policy intervention might then 
be required to speed up the natural ’maturation’ process of liberalized agricultural 
markets. 
Contrary to expectations, we find very little evidence that returns to scale exist in 
agricultural trade. This conclusion is reached after a detailed analysis of transport costs; 
unit margins, marketing costs, and annual value added using survey data from three 
African countries, Benin, Madagascar, and Malawi. Regarding transport costs, we find 
that motorized transport is more cost effective for large loads on longer distances. But 
transporters are often able to pool small quantities from multiple traders. This is 
especially true in Benin where population density and thus the frequency of market 
interaction -- is higher. As a result, traders are able to rely on motorized transport except 
for very short distances, e.g., within a market or a town. We also find no evidence that 
larger trucks are systematically more cost effective than small pickup trucks, although the 
data indicates that traders switch to large trucks for large transactions and long distances.    51
Margin rages show little relationship with transaction size. Albeit univariate 
analysis indicates that margins rates decrease with transaction size in Malawi, the effect 
is no longer significant once we deduct marketing costs, which tend to be proportionally 
larger for small transactions. We also find some evidence that vertically integrated traders 
have higher unit margins, but the evidence is not fully consistent. 
We find that all marketing costs except personal travel increase more or less 
proportionally with transaction size. As anticipated, personal travel costs are a source of 
increasing returns, but the effect is not very large. Consequently, total marketing costs are 
nearly proportional to transaction size. 
Turning to annual value added, we find that working capital and social network 
capital are key determinants of traders’ performance. Labor is non-significant in all 
regressions exceed one. We cannot reject the presence of constant returns to scale in all 
accumulable factors working capital, labor, and social network capital.  
It is often believed that the presence of many small traders in agricultural markets 
is a source of inefficiency. In response to this perception, many governments have 
intervened to restrict entry into agricultural trade, either by licensing traders or rationing 
the allocation of market stalls. The evidence presented here suggests that these policies 
are neither necessary nor useful. 
This does not mean that agricultural markets in Africa could not be improved. It is 
striking to note, for instance, that so little use is made of telephones, invoicing, payment 
by check, grading, quality certification, and brand names. This makes agricultural trade 
unwieldy. Although brokers and other intermediaries are found in Benin, their role 
remains peripheral. Moreover, in the absence of organized commodity exchanges, the use   52
of brokers does not guarantee a fair, transparent price (Gabre-Madhin 2002). Contracts 
for future delivery are virtually unknown and traders cannot seek cover against adverse 
price risk by buying futures.  
Upgrading agricultural markets along these lines would undoubtedly require 
better institutions for the enforcement of contracts, whether formal or informal. Once 
market institutions are modernized, it is not unlikely that returns to concentration and 
vertical integration will arise, triggering a reorganization of the sector away from small 
traders. If anything, the very high returns to network capital that are apparent in the data 
are suggestive of the benefits that could be obtained by reducing commitment failure and 
by sharing information (Fafchamps & Minten 2002). With their current level of 
technology and institutional sophistication, however, large traders have no strong 
advantage over small ones. There is no efficiency reason why the presence of small 
agricultural traders should be discouraged. Policies to upgrade agricultural markets 
should focus instead on technological and institutional innovations. 




Ahmed, R. and N. Rustagi. 1984. Agricultural Marketing and Price Incentives: A 
Comparative Study of African and Asian Countries. Washington, D.C. IFPRI.  
 
Badianne, O., F. Goletti, M. Kherallah, P. Berry, K. Govindan, P. Gruhn and M. 
Mendoza. 1997. Agricultural Input and Output Marketing Reforms in African 
Countries. Washington, D.C. IFPRI. Final donor report. 
 
Badiane, O. and G. E. Shively. 1998. ￿Spatial Integration, Transport costs, and the 
Response of Local Prices to Policy Changes in Ghana.￿ Journal of Development 
Economics 56(2): 411-31. 
 
Bain, J.S. 1956. Barriers to new Competition: Their Character and Consequences in 
Manufacturing Industries. Cambridge, Mass.: Harved U.P. 
 
Barrett, C.B. 1997a. ￿Food Marketing Liberalization and Trader Entry: Evidence from 
Madagascar.￿ World Development 25(5): 763-777. 
 
Barrett, C. B. 1997 b. ￿Liberalization and Food Price Distributions: ARCH-M Evidence 
from Madagascar.￿ Food Policy 22(2):155-173. 
 
Barrett, C.B. and P. Dorosh. 1996. ￿Farmers￿ Welfare and Changing Food Prices: Non-
para-metric Evidence from Rice in Madagascar.￿ American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 78:656-669. 
 
Bauer, P.T. 1954. West African Trade: A Study of Competition, Oligopoly and Monopoly 
in a Changing Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge U.P. 
 
Baulch, B. 1997. ￿Transfer Costs, Spatial Arbitrage, and Testing for Food Market 
Integration.￿ American Journal of Agricultural Economics 79(2): 477-487. 
 
Benischka, M. and J.K. Binkley. 1995. ￿Optimal Storage and Marketing over Space and 
Time.￿ American Journal of Agricultural Economics pp. 512-24. 
 
Berg, Elliot. 1989. ￿The Liberalization of Rice Marketing in Madagascar.￿ World 
Development 17, no. 5:719-728. 
 
Beynon, J., S. Jones and S. Yao. 1992. ￿Market Reform and Private Trade in Eastern and 
Southern Africa.￿ Food Policy 17:399-408. 
   54
Biswanger, H.P., S.R. Khander and M.R. Rosenzweig. 1993. ￿How Infrastructure and 
Financial Institutions affect Agricultural Output and Investment in India.￿ Journal 
of Development Economics 41:337-366. 
 
Cohen, A. 1969. Custom and Politics in Urban: A Study of Hausa Migrants in Yoruba 
Towns. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
Coulter, J. and C. Poulton. 1999. Cereal Market Liberalization in Africa. In Commodity 
Reforms: Background, Process, and Ramifications. Washington, D.C.: The World 
Bank. 
 
Dercon, S. 1995. ￿On Market Integration and Liberalisation: Method and Application to 
Ethiopia.￿ Journal of Development Studies 32(1): 112-143. 
 
Dornbusch, R., S. Fisher and P.A. Samuelson. 1977. ￿Comparative Advantage, Trade, 
and Payments in a Ricardian Model with a Continuum of Goods.￿ American 
Economic Review 67(5): 823-39. 
 
Dorosh, P. and R. Bernier. 1994. Staggered Reforms and Limited Success: Structural 
Adjustments in Madagascar. In Adjusting to Policy Failure in African Economies. 
Ithaca and London: David Sahn (ed), food Systme and Agrarian Change Series, 
Cornell University Press pp. 332-365. 
 
Eddy, E. 1979. Labor and Land Use on Mixed Farms in the Pastoral Zone of Niger. 
University of Michigan. Livestock Production and Marketing in the Entente 
States of West Africa, Monograph No. 3. 
 
Fafchamps, M. and B. Minten. 1999. ￿Relationships and Traders in Madagascar.￿ 
Journal of Development Studies 35(6): 1-35. 
 
Fafchamps, M. and B. Minten. 2001. ￿Social Capital and Agricultural Trade.￿ American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics 83(3): 680-685. 
 
Fafchamps, M. and E. Gabre-Madhin. 2001. Agricultural Markets in Benin and Malawi: 
Operation and Performance of Traders. World Bank Policy Research Working 
Paper No. 2734, Washington, DC: The World Bank, December. 
 
Gabre-Madhin, E. 2001. ￿Market Institutions, Transaction Costs, and Social Capital in 
the Ethiopian Grain Market,￿ Research Report No. 124, Washington, DC: 
International Food Policy Research Institute, December. 
 
Gabre-Madhin, E. 2001. ￿The Role of Intermediaries in Enhancing Market Efficiency in 
the Ethiopian Grain Market.￿ Agricultural Economics (25): 311-320. 
   55
Gabre-Madhin, E., M. Fafchamps, R. Kachule, B. Soule and Z, Khan. 2001. Impact of 
Agricultural Market Reforms on Smallholder Farmers in Benin and Malawi. Final 
Report, Volume 2. Washington, D.C.: IFPRI. 
 
Gardner, B. 1975. ￿The Farm Retail Price in a Competitive Industry.￿ American Journal 
of Agricultural Economics 57:399-409. 
 
Gersovitz, M. 1992. ￿Transportation, State Marketing, and the Taxation of the 
Agricultural Hinterland.￿ Journal of Political Economy 97:1113-1137. 
 
Gersovitz, M. 1992. ￿Transportation Policy and Pan territorial Pricing in Africa.￿ World 
Bank Economic Review 6(2): 213-231. 
 
Jacoby, H.G. 2000. ￿Access to Markets and the Benefits of Rural Roads.￿ Economic 
Journal 110(465): 713-37. 
 
Jaffee, S. and J. Morton. 1995. Marketing Africa￿s High-Value Foods: Comparative 
Experience of an Emergent Private Sector. Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall-Hunt 
Publishing Company. 
 
Jayne, T.S. and S. Jones. 1997.￿Food Marketing and Pricing Policy in Eastern and 
Southern Africa: A Survey.￿ World Development 25-1505-27. 
 
Jones, W.O. 1959. Manioc in Africa. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
 
Kherallah, M., C. Delgado, E. Gabre-Madhin, N. Minot and M. Jonhson. 2000. The Road 
Half-Traveled: Agricultural Market Reform in Sub-Saharan Africa. Washington 
DC: International Food Policy Research Institute. 
 
Maddala, G.S. 1983. Limited-Dependent and Qualitative Variable in Econometrics. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Meillassoux, C. 1971. The Development of Indigenous Trade and Markets in West Africa. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Millan, J.A. 1999. ￿Market Power in the Spanish Food, Drink, and Tobacco Industries.￿ 
European Review of Agricultural Economics 26:229-243. 
 
Minten, B. and S. Kyle. 1999. ￿The Effect of Distance and Road Quality on Food 
Collection, Marketing Margins, and Traders￿ Wages: Evidence from the former 
Zaire.￿ Journal of Development Economics 60:467-495. 
 
Morrison, P.C.J. and D. Siegel. 1997. ￿External Capital Factors and Increasing Returns to 
Scale in US Manufacturing.￿ Review of Economics and Statistics 79(4): 647-654.   56
Morrison, P.C.J. and D. Siegel. 1999.￿Scale Economies and Industry Agglomeration: A 
Dynamic Cost Functions Approach.￿ American Economic Review 89:272-290. 
 
Omamo, S.W. 1998. ￿Transport Costs and Smallholder Cropping Choices: An 
Application to Siaya District, Kenya.￿ American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 80:116-123. 
 
Ravallion, M. 1986. ￿Testing Market Integration.￿ American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics. 68(1): 102-109. 
 
Roubaud, F. 1997. ￿La Question Rizicole a Madagascar: Les Resultats d une Decenie de 
Liberalisation.￿ Economie de Madagascar 2:37-62. 
 
Seppala, P. 1997. Food Marketing Reconsidered: an Assessment of the Liberalization of 
Food Marketing in Sub-Saharan Africa. Helsinki: UNU/WIDER. Research for 
action No 34. 
 
Shuttleworth, G. 1989. ￿Policies in Transition: Lessons from Madagascar.￿ World 
Development  17(3):397-408. 
 
Staatz, J.M., J. Dione and N. Nango Dembele. 1989. ￿Cereals Market Liberalization in 
Mali.￿ World Development 17, no. 5:703-718. 
 
Sutton, J. 1998. Technology and Market Structure: Theory and History. Cambridge and 
London: MIT Press. 
 
Swinnen, J.F.M. 1997. Political Economy of Agrarian Reform in Central and Eastern 
Europe. New York: Ashgate. 
 
Takayama, T. and G.G. Judge. 1971. Spatial and Temporal Price and Allocation Models. 
Amsterdam: North-Holland. 
 
Timmer, C. Peter. 1986. Getting Prices Right: The Scope and Limits of Agricultural 
Price Policy. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
 
Tybout, J.R. 2000. ￿Manufacturing Firms in Developing Countries: How Well Do They 





   57




1.  Foodgrain Market Integration Under Market Reforms in Egypt, May 1994 by 
Francesco Goletti, Ousmane Badiane, and Jayashree Sil. 
 
2.  Agricultural Market Reforms in Egypt: Initial Adjustments in Local Output 
Markets, November 1994 by Ousmane Badiane. 
 
3.  Agricultural Market Reforms in Egypt: Initial Adjustments in Local Input 
Markets, November 1994 by Francesco Goletti. 
  
4.  Agricultural Input Market Reforms: A Review of Selected Literature, June 1995 
by Francesco Goletti and Anna Alfano. 
 
5.  The Development of Maize Seed Markets in Sub-Saharan Africa, September 1995 
by Joseph Rusike. 
 
6.  Methods for Agricultural Input Market Reform Research: A Tool Kit of 
Techniques, December 1995 by Francesco Goletti and Kumaresan Govindan. 
 
7.  Agricultural Transformation: The Key to Broad Based Growth and Poverty 
Alleviation in Sub-Saharan Africa, December 1995 by Christopher Delgado. 
 
8.  The Impact of the CFA Devaluation on Cereal Markets in Selected CMA/WCA 
Member Countries, February 1996 by Ousmane Badiane. 
 
9.  Smallholder Dairying Under Transactions Costs in East Africa, December 1996 
by Steven Staal, Christopher Delgado, and Charles Nicholson. 
 
10.  Reforming and Promoting Local Agricultural Markets: A Research Approach, 
February 1997 by Ousmane Badiane and Ernst-August Nuppenau. 
 
11.  Market Integration and the Long Run Adjustment of Local Markets to Changes in 
Trade and Exchange Rate Regimes: Options For Market Reform and Promotion 
Policies, February 1997 by Ousmane Badiane. 
 
12.  The Response of Local Maize Prices to the 1983 Currency Devaluation in Ghana, 
February 1997 by Ousmane Badiane and Gerald E. Shively. 
 
 
   58




13.  The Sequencing of Agricultural Market Reforms in Malawi, February 1997 by MylŁne 
Kherallah and Kumaresan Govindan. 
 
14.  Rice Markets, Agricultural Growth, and Policy Options in Vietnam, April 1997 by 
Francesco Goletti and Nicholas Minot. 
 
15.  Marketing Constraints on Rice Exports from Vietnam, June 1997 by Francesco 
Goletti, Nicholas Minot, and Philippe Berry. 
 
16.  A Sluggish Demand Could be as Potent as Technological Progress in Creating 
Surplus in Staple Production: The Case of Bangladesh, June 1997 by Raisuddin 
Ahmed. 
 
17.  Liberalisation et Competitivite de la Filiere Arachidiere au Senegal, October 
1997 by Ousmane Badiane. 
 
18.  Changing Fish Trade and Demand Patterns in Developing Countries and Their 
Significance for Policy Research, October 1997 by Christopher Delgado and 
Claude Courbois. 
 
19.  The Impact of Livestock and Fisheries on Food Availability and Demand in 2020, 
October 1997 by Christopher Delgado, Pierre Crosson, and Claude Courbois. 
 
20.  Rural Economy and Farm Income Diversification in Developing Countries, 
October 1997 by Christopher Delgado and Ammar Siamwalla. 
 
21.  Global Food Demand and the Contribution of Livestock as We Enter the New 
Millenium, February 1998 by Christopher L. Delgado, Claude B. Courbois, and 
Mark W. Rosegrant. 
 
22.  Marketing Policy Reform and Competitiveness: Why Integration and Arbitrage 
Costs Matter, March 1998 by Ousmane Badiane. 
 
23.  Returns to Social Capital among Traders, July 1998 by Marcel Fafchamps and 
Bart Minten. 
 
24.  Relationships and Traders in Madagascar, July 1998 by M. Fafchamps and B. 
Minten. 
   59
MSSD DISCUSSION PAPERS 
 
 
25.  Generating Disaggregated Poverty Maps: An application to Viet Nam, October 
1998 by Nicholas Minot. 
 
26.  Infrastructure, Market Access, and Agricultural Prices: Evidence from 
Madagascar, March 1999 by Bart Minten. 
 
27.  Property Rights in a Flea Market Economy, March 1999 by Marcel Fafchamps 
and Bart Minten. 
 
28.  The Growing Place of Livestock Products in World Food in the Twenty-First 
Century, March 1999 by Christopher L. Delgado, Mark W. Rosegrant, Henning 
Steinfeld, Simeon Ehui, and Claude Courbois. 
 
29.  The Impact of Postharvest Research, April 1999 by Francesco Goletti and 
Christiane Wolff. 
 
30.  Agricultural Diversification and Rural Industrialization as a Strategy for Rural 
Income Growth and Poverty Reduction in Indochina and Myanmar, June 1999 by 
Francesco Goletti. 
 
31.  Transaction Costs and Market Institutions: Grain Brokers in Ethiopia, October 
1999 by Eleni Z. Gabre-Madhin. 
 
32.  Adjustment of Wheat Production to Market reform in Egypt, October 1999 by 
Mylene Kherallah, Nicholas Minot and Peter Gruhn. 
 
33.  Rural Growth Linkages in the Eastern Cape Province of South Africa, October 
1999 by Simphiwe Ngqangweni. 
 
34.  Accelerating Africa￿s Structural Transformation:  Lessons from East Asia, 
October 1999, by Eleni Z. Gabre-Madhin and Bruce F. Johnston. 
 
35.  Agroindustrialization Through Institutional Innovation:  Transactions Costs, 
Cooperatives and Milk-Market Development in the Ethiopian Highlands, 
November 1999 by Garth Holloway, Charles Nicholson, Christopher Delgado, 
Steven Staal and Simeon Ehui. 
 
36.  Effect of Transaction Costs on Supply Response and Marketed Surplus:  
Simulations Using Non-Separable Household Models, October 1999 by Nicholas 
Minot. 
   60
MSSD DISCUSSION PAPERS 
 
 
37.  An Empirical Investigation of Short and Long-run Agricultural Wage Formation 
in Ghana, November 1999 by Awudu Abdulai and Christopher Delgado. 
 
38.  Economy-Wide Impacts of Technological Change in the Agro-food Production 
and Processing Sectors in Sub-Saharan Africa, November 1999 by Simeon Ehui 
and Christopher Delgado. 
 
39.  Of Markets and Middlemen: The Role of Brokers in Ethiopia, November 1999 by 
Eleni Z. Gabre-Madhin. 
 
40.  Fertilizer Market Reform and the Determinants of Fertilizer Use in Benin and 
Malawi, October 2000 by Nicholas Minot, Mylene Kherallah, Philippe Berry. 
 
41.  The New Institutional Economics: Applications for Agricultural Policy Research 
in Developing Countries, June 2001 by Mylene Kherallah and Johann Kirsten. 
 
42.  The Spatial Distribution of Poverty in Vietnam and the Potential for Targeting, 
March 2002 by Nicholas Minot and Bob Baulch. 
 
43.  Bumper Crops, Producer Incentives and Persistent Poverty: Implications for 
Food Aid Programs in Bangladesh, March 2002 by Paul Dorosh, Quazi 
Shahabuddin, M. Abdul Aziz and Naser Farid. 
 
44.  Dynamics of Agricultural Wage and Rice Price in Bangladesh: A Re-examination, 
March 2002 by Shahidur Rashid. 
 
45.  Micro Lending for Small Farmers in Bangladesh: Does it Affect Farm 
Households￿ Land Allocation Decision?, September 2002 by Shahidur Rashid, 
Manohar Sharma, and Manfred Zeller. 
 
46.  Rice Price Stabilization in Bangladesh: An Analysis of Policy Options, October 
2002 by Paul Dorosh and Quazi Shahabuddin 
 
47.  Comparative Advantage in Bangladesh Crop Production, October 2002 by Quazi 
Shahabuddin and Paul Dorosh. 
 
48.  Impact of Global Cotton Markets on Rural Poverty in Benin, November 2002 by 
Nicholas Minot and Lisa Daniels. 
 
   61
MSSD DISCUSSION PAPERS 
 
 
49.  Poverty Mapping with Aggregate Census Data: What is the Loss in Precision? 
November 2002 by Nicholas Minot and Bob Baulch. 
 
50.  Globalization and the Smallholders: A Review of Issues, Approaches, and 
Implications, November 2002 by Sudha Narayanan and Ashok Gulati. 
 
51.  Rice Trade Liberalization and Poverty, November 2002 by Ashok Gulati and 
Sudha Narayanan. 
 
52.  Fish as Food: Projections to 2020 Under Different Scenarios, December 2002 by 
Christopher Delgado, Mark Rosegrant, Nikolas Wada, Siet Meijer, and 
Mahfuzuddin Ahmed. 
 
53.  Successes in African Agriculture: Results of an Expert Survey,. January 2003 by 
Eleni Z. Gabre-Madhin and Steven Haggblade. 
 
54.  Demand Projections for Poultry Products and Poultry Feeds in Bangladesh, 
January 2003 by Nabiul Islam. 
 
55.  Implications of Quality Deterioration for Public Foodgrain Stock Management 
and Consumers in Bangladesh, January 2003 by Paul A. Dorosh and Naser Farid. 
 
56.  Transactions Costs and Agricultural Productivity: Implications fo Isolation for 
Rural Poverty in Madagascar, February 2003 by David Stifel, Bart Minten, and 
Paul Dorosh. 
 
57.  Agriculture Diversification in South Asia: Patterns, Determinants, and Policy 
Implications, February 2003 by P.K. Joshi, Ashok Gulati, Pratap S. Birthal, and 
Laxmi Tewari. 
 
58.  Innovations in Irrigation Financing: Tapping Domestic Financial Markets in 








   62
MTID* DISCUSSION PAPERS 
 
 
59.  Livestock Intensification and Smallholders: A Rapid Reconnaisance of the 
Philippines Hog and Poultry Sectors, April 2003 by Agnes Rola, Walfredo Rola, 




































* Effective April 1, 2003, Markets and Structural Studies Division (MSSD) was renamed as the Markets, 
Trade and Institutions Division (MTID). 
 